So, before we get into the birthday cake and independence speeches, let���s walk through some of the rules and legal frameworks that have managed to survive 鰻庄乙艶姻庄温���s journey from colony to republic, military rule to democracy, and landlines to smartphones.

Punishment for attempting suicide

For years, 鰻庄乙艶姻庄温���s criminal laws have treated an attempt to take one���s own life as an . The provision sits in the , while similar provisions exist under the applicable in parts of Northern Nigeria. It is a striking example of how an old legal approach can remain in place even as the society around it changes.

On August 19, 2026, the Federal Executive Council (FEC) approved a proposed to the National Mental Health Act to remove criminal penalties for attempted suicide. Health Minister Muhammad Ali Pate said the proposed would replace punishment with treatment, protection and support. The government also acknowledged that attempted suicide remains an offence under provisions from the colonial-era Criminal Code and Penal Code.

And on September 10, 2026, the Federal Government that it was taking further steps to decriminalise attempted suicide following FEC���s approval in August. 

The argument for changing the law is fairly straightforward. Someone experiencing a mental health crisis who survives an attempt can end up dealing with the police and the criminal justice system on top of whatever pushed them to that point. The proposed amendment still has to go through the National Assembly, so the law has not disappeared yet. But the fact that the government is now seeking to remove the offence says something about how dramatically attitudes towards mental health and suicide have changed since those provisions were created.

If poverty is a crime

Then there are the dealing with people described as ���idle and disorderly��� or ���rogues and vagabonds���. And no, these are not referring to thugs or agberos. 

These provisions are contained in , with covering a range of conduct including wandering, loitering, and other behaviours considered capable of causing a breach of the peace.

On paper, such provisions may sound like ordinary public-order rules. In practice, legal commentators have long raised about the discretion they give law enforcement officers and the way petty-offence laws can affect people who are homeless, unemployed or otherwise living on the margins of society. A 2017 Guardian of 鰻庄乙艶姻庄温���s petty-offence regime noted that jurists had criticised the laws for exposing poor people to exploitation and unnecessary contact with the criminal justice system.

The problem is historical. Vagrancy laws of this kind have in British law, including England���s . Nigeria inherited the legal tradition and retained parts of it after independence. Legal scholars have since that provisions built around concepts such as the ���idle person��� and ���vagabond��� have little place in a modern criminal justice system and should be abolished or substantially reworked.

Come to think of it, a law that was once designed to control movement and public order can have a very different meaning in a country where millions of people work informally, move between cities looking for jobs, and live without the sort of fixed address that the old legal imagination appears to assume.

48-year-old Land Use Act

Not every outdated framework came directly from colonial rule. Some are products of independent 鰻庄乙艶姻庄温���s own history, including the

The law changed land by vesting all land in each state in the governor, to be held in trust for the people. It was during the military era to bring greater control and uniformity to 鰻庄乙艶姻庄温���s complicated land tenure system. Nearly five decades later, however, the system remains a source of for property owners, developers, farmers and ordinary Nigerians trying to obtain legal title to land.

The is not difficult to find. In March 2025, Vice-President Kashim Shettima said the 48-year-old Act was due for , acknowledging that while it had shaped land administration for decades, it had also contributed to systemic problems that needed to be addressed.

Housing and property experts have also to the slow process of obtaining titles and the difficulty of converting property into usable economic assets. Some have described the Act as obsolete, while others have called for a of the way land is administered.

For Nigerians who have ever spent months chasing a Certificate of Occupancy, obtaining consent, or moving from one government office to another just to establish what they already believe they own, this is probably one of the easier examples to understand.��

The country has expanded its cities, increased in population, and has a wider property market and larger economy, but land paperwork has struggled to keep pace.

The 1999 Constitution

The Constitution presents a slightly different problem because it is not an old colonial document. The came into force at the end of military rule and has governed since May 29, 1999. Yet the arguments around its structure and origins are as clear as day.

For years, critics have it as a military-era constitution imposed on Nigerians without sufficient popular participation. Former Head of State Abdulsalami Abubakar against that description in June 2026, saying that about 95 per cent of the document was derived from the 1979 Constitution, drafted by civilian legal experts. He said the 1999 Constitution was after a committee headed by Justice Niki Tobi found broad support for the 1979 Constitution with amendments.

That does not settle the argument of whether the constitutional structure works well for Nigeria. Scholars and constitutional reform advocates have raised concerns about the at the centre, the between the federal and state governments, the and the the document. Those debates have produced repeated calls for restructuring, constitutional amendments or an entirely new constitutional settlement.

The document has also been several times since 1999, with the last amendment coming into effect on December 29, 2005. 

This series of amendment processes is a reminder that constitutions are not supposed to be museum pieces. The difficult part is agreeing on what should change and getting enough political actors across the federation to agree to change it.

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Despite new laws, still the same old police 

Nigeria’s policing system carries an even longer history. The Nigeria Police Force , and the remained part of the legal history of the force for decades. A major eventually arrived with the , which repealed the Police Act 2004.

The reform did not end there. In April 2026, the Federal Government new Nigeria Police Regulations after years of recognising that parts of the existing regulations had been overtaken by changes in policing, technology and society. The Ministry of Police Affairs further said the 2026 regulations were intended to outdated provisions and bring police operations into line with the Police Act 2020 and democratic policing principles.

Yet the structure of policing remains one of 鰻庄乙艶姻庄温���s longest-running . Nigeria still operates a , while advocates of state police have that policing closer to communities could improve local intelligence and responsiveness. 

That means the legal reform conversation has moved from simply replacing old police regulations to asking a much larger question about how policing itself should be organised in a federation of more than 200 million people.

Your workplace laws might be obsolete 

鰻庄乙艶姻庄温���s , remains the country���s major legislation on factory safety, health and welfare. But lawmakers have been pushing to replace it, with the sponsor of a 2025 Occupational Health and Safety Bill that the framework has roots in the colonial industrial era and no longer adequately reflects modern workplaces.

Tax law has gone through a similar overhaul. enacted in 2025 replaced and consolidated several older statutes, with the government saying the reforms would simplify tax administration. 

The legal profession is another example. In 2025, President Bola Tinubu a bill to the National Assembly seeking to scrap the Legal Practitioners Act. The existing Act was originally , even though the current statute is cited as the 2004 version.

These reforms show that several laws governing Nigerians are being reconsidered because they no longer fit the country���s current realities. As the country changes, its laws have to change with it.

What happens now?

Nigeria cannot continue to leave its old laws to gather dust. The , formed in 1979, is the institution expected to go through the country���s laws, spot the ones that have become obsolete or no longer reflect modern realities, and recommend what should be changed or scrapped.

On Wednesday, August 13, 2025, the Commission���s chairman, Prof. Dakas C.J. Dakas, said the Commission would identify obsolete laws for reform because many of those still on 鰻庄乙艶姻庄温���s books date back to the colonial period.

And there is quite a bit to look through. Laws, unlike milk, do not come with an expiry date printed on the packet. So some of them can sit quietly in the statute book for years, even decades, long after the country they were written for has changed completely.

Nigeria at 66 has changed plenty. We have moved from colonial administration to independence, military rule to democracy, landlines to smartphones, paper files to AI, and an economy that keeps inventing new ways to surprise everybody. Some old laws have kept up, either because they still make sense or because they have been amended over time. Others, however, seem to have missed the memo that Nigeria has moved on.

The idea is pretty simple: laws should make sense for the people and the country they are meant to serve. If a law was written for a Nigeria that no longer exists, leaving it untouched can start to feel like trying to use your grandfather���s 1970s map to find your way around Lagos today. You might recognise some of the roads, but good luck with the rest. 

After 66 years of independence, revisiting the old laws on the books is part of keeping the legal system in step with the country itself. Nigeria has changed and can’t keep saying ���we move��� while still holding on to everything from the old era.

Nigeria didn’t get its independence because a few people asked nicely in 1960. People protested, mobilised striking workers, and maintained pressure when votes and hope were lost. And now, 66 years later, as we remember the day by taking children to the parade ground, watching the national proceedings on television, or relaxing at home for the much���needed public holiday, we helped you do the homework by listing out some not-so-popular people who were instrumental to 鰻庄乙艶姻庄温���s independence.��

Here are four key figures that we may not necessarily associate with independence:

Hajia Gambo Sawaba

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Some people may know her as the most jailed female politician of all time. But Hajia Gambo Sawaba���s story started long before her prison visits. In 1933, when Sawaba was born, the British colonialists governed Nigeria with an , where subsidiary governments would implement the colonial policies on a local level. 

In Zaria, where Sawaba lived at the time, the was the native authority at the time, implementing British rule in Northern Nigeria. So when Malam Aminu Kano created the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), with a philosophy centred on women���s rights and education, Sawaba signed up at 17.

As the leader of the national women’s wing of NEPU, Sawaba maintained pressure on the colonial-backed government of the time. She was a key figure in the NEPU establishment that defied British authority and its local allies, even though she faced a lot of abuse, intimidation, and imprisonment along the way. She would often have her head shaved and was once , and she often faced torture in detention.

She died in 2001 from a protracted illness at the age of 71. Leaving a legacy of pioneering women���s welfare and political self-determination.

Michael Imoudu

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Michael Imoudu was a champion of labour unions at a time in Nigeria when these unions were not the vibe. Imoudu was born in 1902 in Edo State, and after losing his parents at the age of 20, he started work in the railways as a linesman. 

He joined the Railway Workers Union (RWU), which marked the beginning of his labour union activities. He became the union president in 1939, and in 1941, he started demanding that the colonial government to improve workers’ working conditions. Much of his work in the following years helped lead to the 1945 General Strike from the railway union, which lasted 45 days and drew in tens of thousands of workers, starting with the railways and spreading to other public services.

show that this strike and other union activities created a sense of a shared national experience through nationwide action that cut across ethnicities and regions, placing further pressure on the colonial government at the time. 

In 1946, Imoudu was nominated to the executive council of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), a nationalist party founded by Herbert to fight British imperialism and achieve self���government. In this position, he continued to lead the trade and labour union fronts that challenged the working conditions and systems imposed by British rule.

He passed away in 2005, at 102, in Oro, Kwara State, long retired from labour unions.

Remi Fani-Kayode

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Chief Remi Fani-Kayode was a lawyer and a nationalist politician who was elected the deputy premier of the Western Region of Nigeria in 1963. Fani-Kayode notably moved the motion for Nigeria’s independence in the Federal House of Assembly. 

But even before this, Chief Remi Fani-Kayode was heavily involved in advocacy. In 1954, he was appointed the youth wing leader of the Action Group political party and served as the assistant federal secretary. 

In his time with the Action Group, Fani-Kayode represented ethnic minorities in the Willink Commission of 1957,  a commission set up to address the concerns of ethnic minorities in Northern Nigeria. His time with the Action Group youth wing was also characterised by vibrant and active movements against British rule. He and his comrades would wear black shirts and use the mosquito emblem, which was meant to express their opposition to British colonial rule. He was even detained for it at some point. 

He passed away in Brighton, England, from natural causes at the age of 73.

Margaret Ekpo

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Margaret Ekpo can be regarded as a fierce mobilizer. She was an activist and politician who rallied women across the country to champion their interests. Ekpo was born in 1914 in Cross River State. She stopped her education at primary six after she lost her father in 1934, then went on to become a pupil-teacher.

Her first involvement in politics came when she represented her husband at meetings discussing the indiscriminate practices of the colonial leadership. Soon enough, she was mobilising market women into unions to push for women���s economic rights and the political rights of low- to middle-class Nigerians. 

Ekpo was a key delegate at the 1953 London Constitutional Conference, which introduced federalism and granted regional autonomy to Nigeria. This conference and others were . From 1958, she became increasingly , with a particular focus on women and their role in the struggle for independence. These actions and initiatives were key in the background leading up to the constitutional reforms and political negotiations that secured Nigerian independence.

She passed away at 92 from natural causes at the University of Calabar Teaching Hospital. 

At the end of the day���

The interesting thing about these stories is that, on paper, their contributions to independence are less celebrated or documented than those of the Awolowos and Azikiwes. Yet, Independence Day did not arrive in a single speech, political rally, or visit to London.

It was assembled from 45-day strikes, women���s protests in Aba, and a handful of people who wrestled their way into rooms where the future was being written. Not all of them appear on our Naira notes, but all of them are part of the reason there is even a country to celebrate on October 1. 

Central to the policies and strategies unveiled is the idea of a technology-driven government that delivers services digitally from the start, where data drives decisions, and citizens can interact with public institutions as easily as they use their phones. The Digital Government Policy Framework (DGPF), an ambitious blueprint launched in 2020 for a smarter, more responsive state, outlines this vision across six pillars, with initiatives like Digital by Design and Proactive Governance. However, ambition alone doesn���t build systems; it requires execution.

In theory, Digital by Design operates on the philosophy that government services should be created with technology at their core. In practice, progress has been slowed by fragmented regulations and uneven capacity across states. While some parts of the country are moving forward, others are playing catch-up, leading to a fragmented system instead of the unified digital experience that these innovations are meant to achieve. 

A similar pattern is evident in the push for a data-driven public sector. There are indeed signs that the Nigerian government is beginning to take data governance more seriously. For example, in trying to achieve a geo-political system of equity and inclusion, all 36 states were reached through the Build-A-thon programme, with learning communities set up that focused on youths and female groups. But what���s missing is consistent, disaggregated data that reflects differences across factors like gender, geography, and income levels. Without this level of detail, policies run the risk of missing the people who need them most, and data can not be effectively used to create inclusive solutions. 

The same pattern appears in Government as a Platform���s vision, which envisions an interconnected, efficient, and accessible public service. While infrastructure investments like the installation of 145,000km of fibre optic cable, which was laid, suggest that the foundation is being built, only 27% of rural LGAs are connected against a target of 60%, making the experience of navigating them still feel disjointed. The promise of seamless digital governance has yet to materialise.

Perhaps more telling is the lingering gap between openness and transparency. While the government has made efforts to engage citizens through consultations, signalling a willingness to be more transparent, limited visibility into program performance makes it difficult to assess how policies are actually working. This disconnect becomes even clearer in user-driven governance. In principle, citizens should help shape the services they use; in practice, feedback channels are often weak or inaccessible, particularly for rural areas or underserved communities. 

On the brighter side, Nigeria appears to have made real progress in building its digital backbone with broadband infrastructure expansion and continued growth in the telecommunications ecosystem. However, only about 27 percent of local governments have reliable connectivity compared to their urban counterparts. This means that for millions of Nigerians, the digital economy still feels out of reach, a divide with real consequences.

Beyond infrastructure, a deeper structural challenge is coordination. Nigeria has a deep-seated challenge of aligning efforts across different agencies working toward similar goals. Policies are developed and launched in isolation, creating a system that moves while being pulled in different directions. The startup ecosystem, for example, boasts over 12,000 registered startups and billions in investment, but still lacks stronger institutional support, which means this growth may be difficult to sustain.

Yiaga Africa���s assessment report on President Tinubu���s Renewed Hope Agenda, legal and regulatory framework is described as transitional, with important tools like the National AI Strategy and the Digital Economy Bill still in development and facing delays in enforcement. The Federal Ministry of Communications, Innovation, and Digital Economy (FMoCIDE) has demonstrated leadership, but execution is uneven as a result of poor interagency cooperation and limited connections in local governments. According to the policy assessment brief facilitated by Yiaga Africa, more than 12,000 registered firms and ���21 billion in investments raised in 2025, the Startup Ecosystem is referred to as emerging but is not institutionalised and threatened by issues including poor budgetary integration and sluggish tax incentive disbursement.

Similarly, the national Build-A-Thon STEM effort emphasises the importance of human capital development; nonetheless, inclusion mechanisms remain inadequate, particularly for rural areas, gender-specific data, and disability inclusion. Only 7.7% of young people with training are employed in northern states due to a lack of investments in digital infrastructure. 

The path forward is one where rural connectivity must be improved through reforms like reducing right-of-way costs and investing in alternative power solutions. Policies like the Digital Economy Bill must move from draft to implementation, and coordination across different local governments must become more deliberate and unified. Ultimately, progress must be measured not just by policies announced, but by outcomes experienced by everyday Nigerians.

Read more on the #Fulfillit campaign by Yiaga Africa here

Let’s start with the numbers. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), conflict and insecurity have displaced over 3.2 million people, many of whom are facing . According to the Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), Nigeria has to cater to a population of over 200 million people. In 2022, more than 16,500 people in Borno State , and roughly 176,000 people got psychosocial support. Yet, most of it was funded by Non-governmental Organisations (NGO) and donors, and it barely scratched the surface given the number of displaced and disadvantaged people in Borno and Nigeria as a whole.

To cap it off, the WHO Africa Regional Office says that . Essentially, dealing with mental health challenges is difficult, but dealing with those challenges in Nigeria? Yikes.

Why does this matter?

To start with, Nigeria can be regarded as a country of particular concern when it comes to mental health. We rank 106th out of 147 countries globally in the , a decline from 105th in 2025 and 102nd in 2024. We have a face-me-I-slap-you standard of living, ranking last globally in the . And if trends in insecurity, cost of living, and healthcare are anything to go by, it could get even worse. 

Mental health in a country like this should be very much a matter of great concern. 

But it is not. We���re dealing with diagnosis gaps, manpower shortages, funding limitations, and a lack of the right legal frameworks.

For suicide awareness, this means that people in crisis are not met with a functioning system that can cater to their needs. But from a system perspective, it matters as well, because it undermines our economic output, it can shape the health and livelihoods of generations to come, and it falls on the young bulk of 鰻庄乙艶姻庄温���s population, who could go on to manifest in the form of academic stress, unemployment, substance use, and exposure to violence.

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What is the way forward?

There are some positives for 鰻庄乙艶姻庄温���s mental health culture and capabilities. The was signed into law in 2023, replacing the outdated colonial-era with a mental health framework that is more grounded in human rights and empathy. But it did not decriminalise suicide. In August 2026, the Federal Executive Council (FEC) approved a proposed amendment to the National Mental Health Act that would remove the criminalisation of suicide. It is still pending; we await it. But for now, suicide is still criminalised in Nigeria.

The for the Federal Ministry of Health calls for suicide to be declared a national public health priority, which will involve integrating mental health into primary care, establishing a governance structure, and promoting responsible media reporting of suicide. 

And of course, private and NGO support continues to grow to meet the excess demand, with WHO and organisations like providing intervention, services, and helplines.

Yet, there is still so much to be done and a lot of it boils down to governance. Changing a law that says “we won’t punish you” is not the same as creating a system that says “let us help you.” 

More of the health budget should be allocated for mental health, more primary health centres should incorporate mental health care, more professional training pathways should be introduced, and more data should be established for national suicide and mental health surveillance.

Yes, the government can affect your mental health. Either by the problems they create or the lack of solutions for the mental effects of these problems. For most Nigerians, this effect can cause problems for our well-being, loss of livelihoods, and, sadly enough, suicide.

If it is ���1.63 trillion of public money, the questions would be considerably louder, right?

That is the amount of money now at the centre of an accountability dispute involving the (CBN), after the Auditor-General of the Federation, Shaakaa Kanyitor Chira, flagged trillions of naira in unrecovered loans and questioned the management of funds under several CBN intervention programmes. 

The findings are contained in Volume II of the Auditor-General���s 2023 on Non-Compliance-Internal Control Weakness, published on August 7, 2026, and they cover transactions and activities from January to December 2023. 

���1.63 trillion is a lot of money to throw into one paragraph, so let���s break it down.

States owe ���1.25 trillion 

The (SERAP), citing the Auditor-General���s findings, the CBN had failed to recover ���1.252 trillion in intervention loans granted to different state governments in 2023.

The total amount disbursed across the relevant was reportedly about ���1.814 trillion, of which roughly ���562.3 billion had been recovered by December 31, 2023. That left more than ���1.25 trillion . 

These were loans, so the issue is not that the government handed states free money and the money simply disappeared. The issue flagged by the audit is that a huge amount remained unrecovered.

The Auditor-General reportedly expressed concern that the funds could have been and recommended that the outstanding money be recovered and remitted to the treasury. 

These odd findings open the door to more questions: Which states received the money? How much did each state receive? What were the loans for? What were the repayment terms? When will they be fully repaid?

���116.18 billion for banks

The CBN also reportedly failed to recover ���116.18 billion in granted to distressed and liquidated banks.

The Auditor-General had the CBN did not provide its 2023 audited or draft financial statements, schedules of recoveries, and outstanding balances on these loans for the audit team to examine. The audit also raised that these funds could have been diverted. 

Again, this is public money.

And again, the question is not simply whether someone physically walked away with ���116 billion. It is whether the CBN can show who received the money, how much was disbursed, how much has been recovered, and what remains outstanding.

���262.86 billion for farmers

The third major figure is ���262.86 billion spent under the , which was designed to support farmers and food production. The Auditor-General reportedly the CBN failed to provide the list and number of beneficiaries and information on the programme’s impact for audit assessment. The audit also said some of the money remained with ���Anchors��� and warned that this could hamper the programme���s food-security objectives.��

Think about what that means. A government programme can spend hundreds of billions of naira to support farmers, but when auditors ask who benefited and what impact the programme had, the information available to them is apparently insufficient.

That is the kind of gap that makes accountability difficult.

Where’s the ���1.63 trillion?

The ���1.63 trillion is the combined figure from ���1.252 trillion in unrecovered state intervention loans, ���116.18 billion in unrecovered loans to distressed and liquidated banks, and ���262.86 billion under the Anchor Borrowers��� Programme. Together, they amount to roughly ���1.631 trillion. 

It does not mean the Auditor-General has established that ���1.63 trillion was stolen. What the audit findings establish is that these funds were unrecovered, insufficiently accounted for, or lacked information needed for proper audit assessment. 

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SERAP wants the CBN to open the books

SERAP’s September 26, 2026 letter asked the CBN to disclose the beneficiaries of the state intervention loans, the amounts they received, and the recovery measures taken.

For the Anchor Borrowers��� Programme, SERAP wants the names and number of beneficiaries and participating ���Anchors���, the amounts disbursed, how the money was used, the monitoring arrangements, and recovery measures. 

It has also called for an independent forensic reconciliation of the figures identified by the Auditor-General and wants any funds found to have been improperly lost or diverted recovered and returned to the treasury. 

The CBN has seven days to respond to the demand before SERAP says it will consider legal action. As of September 30, the latest reports available do not show a substantive public response from the CBN to the seven-day demand.

Wait, there’s more

Then there is a separate and potentially more serious issue.

SERAP is also asking the CBN to for $6.23 million reportedly spent following a purported request for election funding attributed to former President Muhammadu Buhari.

According to SERAP’s of the Auditor-General’s findings, the CBN’s internal audit said the money was spent based on the request, but the bank did not provide its investigation report to auditors for scrutiny and confirmation. 

The Auditor-General reportedly expressed concern that the funds may also have been lost and that the payments may have been fraudulent. 

If there���s one thing that should make taxpayers sit up, it���s the idea of public money taking a detour into election funding. Elections are political business; taxpayers��� money is, well, taxpayers��� money. 

So when $6.23 million allegedly leaves the CBN���s vaults in connection with an election-related request, Nigerians are allowed to ask why the public was the one picking up the tab. At the very least, there should be enough paperwork to answer this question without everyone suddenly playing hide-and-seek with the receipts.

The people should know how their money is spent

The CBN handles enormous sums of money, and its interventions can affect farmers, businesses, banks, and state governments.

That makes documentation more than bureaucratic paperwork. If billions are loaned to states, there should be records showing who received the money and whether it was repaid. If hundreds of billions are released for farmers, there should be a clear record of beneficiaries and measurable results.

And when auditors cannot get those records, Nigerians are left trying to reconstruct the journey of public money from audit reports, advocacy groups, and newspaper investigations.

The Auditor-General’s report does not answer every question about the ���1.63 trillion. Neither does SERAP’s letter. Those questions now require answers from the institution responsible for the transactions.

Because ���1.63 trillion and $6.23 million are too much money to disappear into the phrase ���intervention programmes��� and never be heard from again. It wouldn’t be proper.

The agency arrested ten people, including three Mexican nationals and a Nigerian who the agency identified as the alleged leader of the operation.

NDLEA said the laboratory had produced or was processing 2,419.48kg of methamphetamine, which it valued at about $362.9 million, equivalent to over ���480 billion on the international market.

On June 17, barely four weeks after the Abidagba forest arrest, the agency another laboratory in a forest in Tapa Village, Ibarapa North Local Government Area of Oyo State. NDLEA said the operation uncovered a sophisticated, industrial-scale facility containing , industrial catalysts and heavy-duty equipment. 

Five people were arrested, including a 56-year-old Mexican national, Jose Villa Ochoa,  whom the agency said had been brought into Nigeria to provide technical expertise for large-scale methamphetamine production.

These two discoveries are difficult to dismiss as isolated backyard operations. So we took a deep dive, and it appears the picture is becoming increasingly complicated. 

How did we get here? 

For decades, Nigeria’s place in the global drug trade has largely been understood through . Cocaine, heroin, cannabis, methamphetamine and pharmaceutical opioids have through the country, with some destined for Nigerian consumers and others continuing to markets across Africa, Europe and Asia. Nigeria’s large population, extensive road network, busy ports and airports, and its position in West Africa have made it an location for international trafficking networks.

Though Nigeria is still a and a major market for illicit drugs, the country has also been some of them for years. What has changed recently is the scale of some of the operations being , especially the of industrial-scale methamphetamine laboratories in Ogun and Oyo states within weeks of each other.

Nigeria has been producing drugs for years

It would be wrong to suggest that Nigerian drug production started with the two laboratories found this year. The country has had secret drug for more than a decade, particularly facilities producing methamphetamine.

Between January 2015 and December 2016, 鰻庄乙艶姻庄温���s National Drug Control Master Plan (NDCMP) five methamphetamine laboratories in Nigeria and noted that three of them had used ephedrine-based production methods. From June 2011 to March 2016, NAFDAC altogether. In May 2016, the agency eventually that Nigeria was becoming part of the West African methamphetamine production chain, with locally produced meth being trafficked to markets outside the region.

One of the most notable cases came in March 2016, when Nigerian authorities uncovered what was described as a ������ in Asaba, Delta State. The laboratory was reportedly capable of producing between 3,000kg and 4,000kg of methamphetamine per production cycle and was operated with the involvement of Mexican nationals. The discovery showed that Nigerian drug networks were capable of moving beyond simply importing and distributing finished products.

How is this happening?

There is a practical reason why local production changes the drug trade. When a criminal network imports a finished drug, it has to move that drug across an international border before it can reach its market. That creates several points where customs officers, police, anti-narcotics agencies and international partners can intercept it. A network that produces the drug inside the country removes one part of that journey.

It still needs chemicals, equipment, expertise and distribution networks, but the finished product does not have to cross Nigeria’s border before reaching Nigerian buyers or being moved onwards. That makes the discovery of laboratories important because it exposes an entire supply chain rather than a single consignment.

The Ogun case shows how sophisticated that supply chain can become. NDLEA’s noted that precursor chemicals were transported from Lagos to the laboratory in Mowe using vehicles linked to members of the syndicate. 

This shows that local production does not mean the drug trade has become entirely Nigerian. Criminal networks can local knowledge, local property and transportation with expertise and connections from outside the country.

The Oyo operation had a similar pattern. NDLEA said the Mexican suspect arrested there had been brought into Nigeria specifically to provide for large-scale methamphetamine production, while the four Nigerians arrested with him allegedly provided logistical support and handled local operations.

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Strange things in strange places 

NDLEA seizures regularly involve drugs concealed in things that would not immediately attract attention. In March, 2026, officers intercepted drugs hidden water-purifier machines shipped from Europe. In another case in July 2026, large quantities of tramadol and other controlled medicines were in a truck carrying building materials from Togo. The agency has also drugs hidden in vehicle compartments, parcels, and other commercial cargo.

The creativity is not limited to objects. Drug networks also exploit ordinary transportation systems and, in some cases, people who may not even know what they are carrying.

Where did the chemicals come from?

Producing synthetic drugs at this scale requires more than people who know how to mix chemicals. It requires access to , industrial equipment, storage facilities, transportation, and locations where the operation can remain hidden. But where do these chemicals come from? 

The NDLEA monitors controlled chemicals as part of its anti-drug operations. Its is responsible for activities including the identification and dismantling of clandestine laboratories and the monitoring of controlled chemicals that could be diverted for illicit production.

The recent laboratories show why that work matters, or at least, why it should matter. The Oyo facility large drums and containers of precursor chemicals, industrial catalysts, and equipment used in chemical processing. 

The Ogun investigation also a sizable stock of precursor chemicals. According to the filed against the suspects, investigators recovered hundreds of kilograms of toluene and hydrochloric acid, along with acetone, P2P and phenylacetic acid. 

For now, no one can explain how the chemicals got into the hands of the manufacturers.

Should we be worried?

The Ogun laboratory was found in Ijebu East. The Oyo laboratory was discovered in Ibarapa North. Both are in the South-West, and both facilities were hidden in forested areas where large-scale operations could remain out of sight.

On June 3, 2026, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) described the Ogun discovery as , noting that the country is moving from being primarily a transit and consumer market towards becoming an important producer and exporter of synthetic drugs. ISS also highlighted the fact that the latest laboratory was located in a remote forest rather than the urban environments where some previous laboratories had been discovered.

It does not mean every forest community in the country is harbouring a drug laboratory. What it does point to is that law-enforcement agencies now have to look beyond the traditional locations associated with drug trafficking.

What Nigerians look forward to

For the NDLEA, that means dismantling a laboratory is only part of the job. The agency also has to trace where the chemicals came from, who financed the operation, who provided the technical expertise, how the finished product would have been distributed, and whether the network has other facilities operating elsewhere.

For Nigeria, it means the drug story is no longer only about what enters through the ports or what officers find hidden inside a bus. Some of the drugs being moved around the country may have started their journey in a Nigerian forest, produced by a network of experts who have learned how to manufacture them here.

Everything so far suggests law-enforcement agencies will have to keep watch on potential drug-producing forests closely.

Oluwatobi works from home, which requires a lot of electricity. So when the power supply becomes unreliable, he turns to a generator. The arrangement is already expensive, but it is one of the realities of trying to work in a country where electricity can disappear without warning.

The 28-year-old had travelled to stay with a friend for a few weeks in Ibadan, Oyo State. The electricity situation there was unstable, so the generator became more important. 

That Thursday, he went to a filling station with his friend, expecting to purchase the usual quantity of petrol. To his surprise, the money he had planned to spend could no longer buy the same quantity of fuel. What would previously have covered roughly ten litres now bought about half that quantity. The generator still needed fuel, but the money was no longer stretching as far.

For people who depend on generators to work, trade or run their homes, fuel hikes quickly reflect in their daily expenses. The cost of keeping the lights on begins to compete with food, transport, data, rent and other bills.

What���s going on?

Petrol prices have risen across several parts of Nigeria, with placing pump prices between ���1,400 and ���1,450 per litre in Lagos and Abuja. Some locations have recorded even higher prices. There were of ���1,500 per litre in Kano, Sokoto, and Borno, while Adamawa prices were around ���1,600 per litre.

The increase has been partly to higher international crude oil prices and adjustments in the price of petrol supplied by the Dangote Petroleum Refinery. Premium Times that Dangote increased its petrol gantry price from ���1,265 to ���1,350 per litre, as global crude prices rose amid around the Middle East and the Strait of Hormuz.

The Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (NMDPRA), however, it does not determine the prices consumers see at filling stations.

In a issued on September 19, the NMDPRA cited Section 205(1) of the Petroleum Industry Act, which provides for the pricing of petroleum products under unrestricted free-market conditions. It said it does not fix pump prices or issue administrative pricing templates. Government intervention, according to the authority, is permitted only in exceptional circumstances involving a formally declared market failure.

That explanation may clarify the NMDPRA���s legal position, but it does little to change what consumers experience when they arrive at a filling station with the same amount of money and leave with less petrol.

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The regulator says it can still act

Although the NMDPRA says it cannot set pump prices, it maintains that deregulation does not give filling station operators permission to exploit consumers.

The authority it was strengthening collaboration with the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC) to monitor price-gouging, collusion, under-dispensing and the sale of compromised petroleum products. It also mentioned cooperation with the Nigeria Customs Service and other security agencies to monitor border corridors and address the smuggling and illegal diversion of petroleum products.

The NMDPRA also it was creating dedicated reporting channels for consumers and industry stakeholders to report irregular pricing and other exploitative practices. Such complaints, it said, would be investigated and could lead to enforcement action.

This gives the NMDPRA a role in policing the market, even when it does not directly control the price. A station may be allowed to respond to market conditions, but issues such as under-dispensing, collusion and deceptive practices remain subject to regulation.

The challenge is whether these monitoring measures will be visible enough to consumers who are already paying more for petrol and receiving less value from their income.

The cost of running Nigeria keeps rising

Petrol is used to power generators, transport goods, move people, and support several small businesses. When its price rises, the effects can spread through the cost of transportation, logistics, food, and services.

For remote workers like Oluwatobi, fuel is part of the cost of earning an income. A power outage can mean starting a generator, buying petrol, and spending additional money to maintain a working environment. The expense becomes more difficult to manage when the price of petrol changes repeatedly.

Small businesses face a similar burden. A barber, tailor, food seller, content creator, or shop owner who depends on a generator may have to spend more on fuel or reduce the number of hours they operate. Some may transfer part of the cost to their customers, while others absorb it and take home less money.

The pressure also affects people who do not own generators. Higher fuel costs can increase transport fares and raise the cost of moving goods between markets, shops and homes. The impact is often felt in several places before consumers can identify where the increase began.

The NMDPRA���s position is that prices are determined by market forces. For consumers, the immediate reality is simpler: petrol costs more, household budgets are under greater pressure, and every trip to a filling station requires another calculation.

What happens now?

The federal government cannot simply stand aside and watch petrol prices climb while Nigerians are left to adjust their budgets again and again. The relevant agencies must bring oil marketers and other market players to the table, investigate exploitative practices and work towards measures that can prevent sudden, punishing price increases. Deregulation should not become an excuse for regulatory silence.

Nigerians are already paying more for food, transport, electricity and basic services. Every increase in petrol prices adds another weight to a household budget that is struggling to stay upright. If the trend continues unchecked, the cost of living may eventually kill the living.

And when that happens, perhaps Falz���s ���This Is Nigeria��� will no longer sound like a song describing the country. It will sound like a warning we heard, laughed about, and ignored.

On September 11, 2026, Kauna, a student nurse in Gamji, Sokoto, noticed her TikTok app wouldn���t open. She uninstalled and reinstalled it, but it got worse because she could no longer log back in. She checked in with her friend, who also lives in the same area; the same thing happened – TikTok just seemed to be taking forever to load. 

Kauna’s experience mirrors recent social media discussions on how TikTok is being restricted in some northern Nigerian states. Users in Kaduna, Kano, and Sokoto have struggled to use TikTok, with varying accounts of when it was first noticed, causing many to download Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to access the app. Initial described feeds freezing mid-scroll, videos failing to load, and uploads stalling on regular mobile data. But in these cases, access is being restored almost immediately once people switch on VPNs.

So what exactly is happening with TikTok in these northern states? Here���s what we know so far.

There has been no official statement

As of September 23, 2026, there has been no official statement from Nigerian regulators, telecom operators, the National Communications Commission (NCC), the federal government, or state governments in these states. acknowledging any restriction. So there is no official lead as to whether it is a technical fault, a network configuration issue, a traffic-management measure or a deliberate block. 

Raised eyebrows about government censorship

Given that the shutdown is not nationwide, and TikTok is not experiencing a general outage, much of the speculation on social media has been centred on government interference in these states.

Kauna, for example, stated that most people in Sokoto, across all classes, had used TikTok fervently as a source of information, news, and entertainment. She said that the nature of free and decentralised information within the app was likely targeted for censorship, particularly citing the case of allegations surrounding Senator Shehu Buba Umar of Bauchi South and his links with armed terrorist groups.

So what this means for Kauna and millions of Nigerians in these states is that access to such a key part of the social media experience is abruptly disrupted. In Kano alone, for example, there is a who are shaping a niche industry, and these kinds of users and communities are being denied a basic right to information and entertainment. 

But even further, the speculation seems to still be brewing, especially with the 2027 elections approaching. No statements, announcements, or grounds for anything to be challenged. So maybe it’s a glitch, maybe it’s some sort of weird regional routing issue, or maybe it is, indeed, censorship. Whatever the reason is, the silence is speaking volumes.

One of the strongest areas of performance is 鰻庄乙艶姻庄温���s startup and innovation ecosystem, which recorded the highest rating of 3.75 in the policy brief by Yiaga Africa using the GovTech index key across 9 key performance areas on a numerical performance scale of 1-5. The government significantly exceeded its target under the Startup Act, registering nearly 12,948 startups compared to the initial goal of 500. In addition, about 925 government-backed innovation hubs have been established across the country. 

While these figures reflect an active entrepreneurial landscape and growing interest in technology-driven solutions, the assessment notes that access to finance remains a major obstacle, largely because grant disbursement processes are slow and tax relief mechanisms lack transparency. 

Another area of progress is talent development, which scored 3.0. Flagship initiatives such as the 3 Million Technical Talent (3MTT) program have trained approximately 600,000 individuals as of 2025. Programs like the Build-A-Thon initiative have also exceeded expectations in reaching students and introducing them to digital skills. Despite this momentum, a key challenge lies in translating training into employment. 

According to the assessment, only 7.7 percent of trainees secured employment within six months of completing their programs, highlighting a disconnect between skills training and labour market demand. Without stronger partnerships between training programs and employers, Nigeria risks producing a large pool of skilled individuals who struggle to find opportunities to apply their knowledge.

In digital infrastructure, progress remains modest. The sector recorded a rating of 2.5, with approximately 145,000 kilometres of fibre optic cable deployed nationwide, representing about a ten percent increase compared to pre-2023 levels. While this expansion is significant, rural connectivity remains a major challenge, with only 27 percent of rural local government areas currently connected, far below the government���s target of 60 percent. 

The most concerning performance appears in e-government and digital services, which scored 1.75. Despite growing calls for government modernisation, fewer than 20 percent of federal services are fully digitised. This limits the efficiency and accessibility of public services that digital tools are supposed to enhance. Furthermore, national identification coverage remains incomplete. The National Identification Number (NIN) currently covers roughly 51 percent of the population, significantly below the 95 percent target set for 2025. 

These uneven outcomes are driven by several structural challenges. One major issue is policy fragmentation. Key institutions such as the National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA), the Nigeria Data Protection Commission (NDPC), and the Federal Ministry of Communications, Innovation and Digital Economy frequently operate in silos. Overlapping mandates in areas like data protection and cybersecurity can result in duplicated efforts and regulatory confusion. 

Infrastructure constraints further compound these challenges. High Right-of-Way (RoW) fees imposed by state governments continue to slow broadband expansion, particularly in underserved regions. In addition, unreliable power supply and expensive spectrum costs further complicate efforts to scale digital connectivity nationwide. These barriers make it difficult to extend digital services to communities that need them most. 

Another obstacle is the slow pace of legislative reform. The Digital Economy Bill, which could provide a comprehensive regulatory framework for the sector, remains pending in the National Assembly. This delay contributes to uncertainty for investors and innovators alike, potentially slowing the pace of growth in the sector. Inclusion challenges also persist with many digital programs concentrated in urban centres, limiting participation from women, persons with disabilities, and rural populations, particularly in northern states. 

To address these challenges and meet the objectives of the government���s Renewed Hope agenda by 2027, the assessment outlines several recommendations. First, stronger inter-agency coordination is essential. Establishing a dedicated Digital Economy Delivery Taskforce could help harmonise the work of institutions such as NITDA, the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC), and Galaxy Backbone. 

The government must also accelerate reforms by prioritising the passage of the Digital Economy Bill and fully implementing the Startup Act. Furthermore, collaboration with subnational governments is crucial, as state-level ICT agencies must play a greater role in addressing last-mile connectivity challenges and reducing Right-of-Way fees that hinder broadband expansion. 

The report also emphasises the role of public���private partnerships, particularly with major telecommunications companies such as MTN and Airtel, in scaling infrastructure and expanding digital training hubs. Finally, policymakers must take deliberate steps to promote local content, including enforcing procurement standards that prioritise indigenous digital solutions.

Overall, the assessment finds that 鰻庄乙艶姻庄温���s digital economy is clearly moving forward, but progress remains uneven. The country has demonstrated strong potential in innovation and talent development, yet critical weaknesses persist in governance, infrastructure, and inclusion. 

Read more on the #FulfillIt campaign by Yiaga Africa here

That is the situation surrounding 鰻庄乙艶姻庄温���s National Cash Transfer Office (NCTO), after the Auditor-General for the Federation, Shaakaa Kanyitor Chira, about ���33.751 billion in electronic cash transfers made in 2023.

According to the 2024 Annual Report on Non-Compliance and Internal Control Weaknesses in Ministries, Departments and Agencies, the money was to 3,295,207 households and beneficiaries across 35 states. But the Auditor-General says the records available were not enough to verify the said payments.

Before we get into why any of this is a big deal, let’s start with what this cash transfer programme is actually supposed to do, and why anyone outside an accounting office should care.

The cash transfer programme

鰻庄乙艶姻庄温���s National Cash Transfer Programme is part of the country���s for poor and vulnerable households.

The programme is by the National Cash Transfer Office, while the National Social Safety-Nets Coordinating Office (NASSCO) supports the identification of eligible households through the National Social Register (NSR). According to the government, the programme identifies households through geographic and community-based targeting before including them in the register.

The idea is fairly simple. The government identifies households considered poor or vulnerable, and eligible beneficiaries receive direct financial assistance.

The programme has been operating since 2016 as part of 鰻庄乙艶姻庄温���s larger social safety-net system. The government its purpose is to provide regular financial support to poor and vulnerable households, alongside other forms of livelihood assistance.

In all of this, the National Social Register (NSR) is important because it is supposed to provide the database from which eligible households can be identified and supported. So, when billions of naira are subsequently transferred to people on that register, there should be enough records to trace the money from the government to the beneficiaries. And government agencies shouldn’t have to go back-and-forth on who was paid or where the money went. 

So what happened to the ���33.7 billion?

The 2024 report was submitted by the Auditor-General for the Federation to the Clerk of the National Assembly on July 17, 2026.

It said electronic transfers totalling ���33.751 billion were made to 3,295,207 households and beneficiaries in 2023, but problems started when auditors tried to balance the payments with the relevant beneficiary records.

According to the , payment vouchers did not contain sufficient information about the beneficiaries, while the NCTO did not provide the relevant REMITA statements that auditors said they needed to reconcile the payments with the NSR and National Beneficiary Register.

These findings do not mean the ���33.7 billion disappeared, nor does the audit itself establish that the government paid fake beneficiaries. But they reinforce the auditor-general���s claims that there simply isn���t enough evidence to independently verify the payments.

This should raise eyebrows because an audit query is essentially a request for an agency to account properly for public money. So, when you hear that the records are not complete, know that there’s fire on the mountain. 

���Calm down, Mr. Auditor��� ��� NCTO

The NCTO has the concern. In a statement made available to the press on September 9, the office said remittance records were sent to the auditors and explained that its payment records are maintained electronically.

This leaves an issue that should be resolved with documents rather than competing statements: the government should be able to show the records that establish who was paid, when they were paid, and how those payments correspond with the official beneficiary registers.

Why does the paperwork matter?

One, public money needs a trail. For a programme involving millions of beneficiaries, the system should make it possible to follow a payment from the government account to the beneficiary. It should also make it possible to identify errors, duplicate payments, ineligible beneficiaries, or cases where someone listed on the register did not receive the money.

Without reliable records, an auditor has a harder time determining whether the programme worked as intended. The cash-transfer programme is designed to support the country’s poorest and most vulnerable households. So, if a beneficiary receives the money, the records should show that. If a beneficiary doesn’t receive it, the same system should make that failure visible. The point of an audit is to make these things verifiable.

There is a lot of money involved

The ���33.751 billion in the Auditor-General’s finding is from 2023, but Nigeria’s cash-transfer system has continued to .

The current National Social Safety Net programme has been designed to provide support to millions of vulnerable Nigerians, and the government has continued to emphasise the use of beneficiary databases and identity verification in its social-protection programmes. 

NASSCO’s current system, for example, NSR records and National Identification Number (NIN) validation as part of efforts to improve the quality of beneficiary data.

The government has also announced larger cash-transfer initiatives in recent years. In April 2026, it to expand its 2023���2026 conditional cash-transfer programme from 9.2 million beneficiaries to 15 million Nigerians, with the government saying the payments would be tied to systems including NIN to improve transparency and integrity.

That makes proper record-keeping non-negotiable. As the number of beneficiaries and the amount of money moving through the system increase, weaknesses in verification and reconciliation can affect much more than one audit period.

What should happen now?

The Auditor-General’s finding needs to be resolved with evidence. The NCTO should provide the payment records, beneficiary information and reconciliation documents needed to establish how the ���33.751 billion was transferred. 

There is also a lesson here for Nigeria’s social-protection system. A cash-transfer programme depends heavily on accurate data, reliable payment systems and records that can withstand independent scrutiny.

A government agency cannot say millions of vulnerable Nigerians received billions of naira, while an auditor says the documents available don’t show that it’s true. Both statements have to be reconciled with the records being produced and verified. ���33.7 billion is too much public money to leave that uncertainty hanging. Nigerians should be able to see how the money moved, who received it, and whether the programme’s target audience was actually reached.

It���s really as simple as that.